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
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4. PAKISTAN OBTAINS FAVORABLE KASHMIR VOTE IN SECURITY COUNCIL

Comment on:

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The 10-0 vote (USSR abstaining) on Kashmir which Pakistan obtained in the UN Security Council on 24 January will encourage both its government and people and greatly lessen the possibility of serious popular demonstrations or outbreaks on 26 January. Prime Minister Suhrawardy can point to the speed with which the resolution was passed and the heavily favorable vote both on the plebiscite principle and on the invalidity of the actions of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly as evidences of Pakistani diplomatic success.

The next move is for the Security Council to take up Pakistan's proposals for a UN force in Kashmir, probably late next week. With council members heavily supporting Pakistan on 24 January and likely to do so again, the UN force issue may be headed for a Soviet veto. Such a veto would enable Suhrawardy to support his pro-Western foreign policy by contrasting the USSR's friendly words with its hostile actions toward Pakistan. Since India strongly opposed the UN resolution, a veto would also enable Suhrawardy to link India directly with the USSR.

With these four talking points at his command, Suhrawardy will be under less pressure than before to achieve a quick solution of the Kashmir problem.

[Redacted]

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8. INDIAN CONGRESS PARTY IN ELECTION DIFFICULTIES

Comment on:

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Prime Minister Nehru's Congress Party has apparently overestimated its organizational capabilities, has fallen behind its tight election schedule, and seems certain to be only about half prepared for the beginning of the three-week national polling period on 24 February.

Except in the troubled states of West Bengal, Orissa and Kerala, the Congress Party planned a short campaign of about two months' duration. Personal rivalries within the party, however, seriously hampered the choice of candidates. With only a month left for campaigning, Congress has not yet completed its slate, and has been forced to obtain a 10-day postponement of the last day for filing nominations.

Official minutes of executive committee meetings in mid-November show that party district organizations were still not in close contact with the people, and the party presumably will reach fewer voters than it originally intended. The momentum of past party achievements will therefore probably play a large part in carrying the Congress Party through the elections, which are being fought by an increasingly united opposition.